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The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Agency

Action: A Comparison of Federal Law, Uniform State
Acts, and the Iowa APA
By Anuradha Vaitheswaran & Thomas A. Mayes*

Of all areas in administrative law, one of the more fertile areas
for published scholarship' and judicial opinions 2 is the notion of
deference. When, why, and how much should reviewing courts defer
to administrative agency decisions? Should it matter what type of
agency action is being reviewed? The authorities addressing these
points are noticeably divided, even in jurisdictions that have adopted
"model" administrative procedure acts.3

* Anuradha Vaitheswaran (B.A., Grinnell College; J.D. & M.A., University of
Iowa) is a judge on the Iowa Court of Appeals. Thomas A. Mayes (B.A., Baylor
University; J.D., University of Iowa; M.Ed., Lehigh University) is the Legal
Consultant for the Iowa Department of Education's Bureau of Student and Family
Support Services. This article is based on a presentation by Judge Vaitheswaran at
the 2006 Midyear Meeting and Educational Program of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary (June 4, 2006). The authors would like to thank
Andrea Strizke and Amy Teas for their research assistance, and all who attended
the 2006 NAALJ Midyear Meeting. The views expressed herein are solely those of
the authors.

1. See, e.g., William R. Andersen, Against Chevron: A Modest Proposal,56
ADMIN. L. REv. 957 (2004); Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA:
Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1996); Robert A.
Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court's Deferences - A Foolish Inconsistency,
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2000, at 10; Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice,
38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 2081 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
3. See infra Part Ill.

Fall 2007

The Role of Deference in Judicial Review

In 1998, the Iowa legislature amended the Iowa Administrative
Procedure Act (IAPA). 4 In one key provision, the legislature
provided express guidance about when reviewing courts "shall,"
"shall not," and "should not" defer to an agency's action on judicial
review.5 Additionally, the legislature made express references to
deference to agency action in the statutory section on standard of
review. 6 As consideration is being given to including a similar
provision in revisions to the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act,7 this article explores the opinions construing the deference
language from the 1998 amendments to the IAPA. First, it explores
the general concept of deference. 8 Second, it discusses efforts by the
Supreme Court of the United States to articulate when deference to
agency interpretations of law is appropriate. 9 Third, it provides a
brief overview of the treatment of deference by the 1961 and 1981
Model Acts, as well as cases applying those provisions.' ° Fourth, it
provides an in-depth examination of the deference language from
Iowa's 1998 amendments," as well as cases construing and applying
that language. 12 Finally, it provides a look forward, should the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act incorporate some or all of
3
these amendments.'
I. DEFERENCE: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

A plain-language, dictionary-derived definition of "deference" is
"respect or esteem due to a superior or an elder."' 14 This definition

4. Iowa House File 667, 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1202.
5. IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(11) (2007).

6. Id. § 17A.19(10).
7. See, e.g., John L. Gedid, Jim Rossi, Ed Schoenenbaum, & Gregory Ogden,
The Past, Present, and Future of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
Presentation to the 2006 Midyear Meeting and Educational Program of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (June 5, 2006).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part V.
14. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 333 (9th ed. 1986).
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helps illuminate the inevitable conceptual conflict embedded in any
discussion of judicial deference to agency action: When a court is
reviewing an agency action, the agency is the "superior or elder."
The question then becomes how much "respect or esteem" is "due."
In all instances of judicial review of agency action, this question
should be answered by considering the agency's enabling statute the source of its power - and the agency action under review.1 5 As a
general rule, courts are admittedly "superior" concerning
construction and interpretation of law' 6 while administrative agencies
admittedly are "superior" concerning policy-making and admittedly
have "superior" knowledge and expertise in their respective content
areas.' 7 The point of conflict is where the claimed law-construing
prerogative of the reviewing court intersects with the claimed policymaking prerogative and subject matter expertise of the agency which
took the action that is under review. In the terms of Professor Aprill,
the conflict is between the "judicial voice" and the "administrative
voice." 18 This Article's primary focus will be agency interpretations
of statutes or regulations, and, specifically, whether those
interpretations are made in rule-making, policy development, or in
19
contested cases.

15. See, e.g., Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More
Pieces For the Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 700
(2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 920 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent
Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434 (2006) (citing

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)); see also Andersen, supra note 1, at
962; Robert A. Anthony, Which Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2-3 (1990); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference,

ConceptualizingSkidmore within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (2001); Doug Geyser, Note, Courts Still "Say What the Law Is":
Explaining the Function of the JudiciaryAfter Brand X, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2129,
2132-33 (2006).
17. See, e.g., May, supra note 16, at 435-36 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. 86566); see also Andersen, supra note 1, at 962-63 (citing Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 572-73 (1965)).
18. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
19. As the idea of "deference" to an agency's findings of fact is well
established; it will be a minor focus of this Article. For a discussion of an
administrative agency's fact-finding power, see Gregory L. Ogden, The Role of
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The discussion of the nature of deference, and how that deference
is articulated, has demonstrable consequences. 20 In a 1999 study of
200 judicial decisions reviewing agency decisions in special
education cases under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA),2 1 Newcomer and Zirkel found a statistically significant
relationship between the quantity and quality of deference reviewing
courts articulated they would give to agency decisions and the degree
to which those courts altered the administrative decisions.22
Newcomer and Zirkel explain: "Thus, when judges articulated a high
degree of deference, generally little change occurred between the two
decisions; likewise, when they expressed the intent to give no
deference, more change generally occurred. In23other words, as
articulated deference increased, change decreased.,
Judicial review of IDEA cases provides a unique opportunity to
examine the power of deference because judicial review of IDEA
cases differs significantly from judicial review in traditional
administrative law cases.24 In contrast to the traditional "substantial
evidence" review, 25 state or federal courts reviewing IDEA
administrative decisions must grant "appropriate relief' based "on the
preponderance of evidence."26 According to the United States
Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses in Fact Finding: The
View ofALfs, 20 J. N.A.A.L.J. 1 (2000).
20. Rossi, supra note 16, at 1115-16; Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of
Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Retreat from
Chevron Principlesin United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 291 (2002).
21. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400etseq.
22. James R. Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of JudicialOutcomes
of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 469 (1999).

23. Id. at 477; see also Andersen, supra note 1, at 959 (discussing Chevron 's
influence on case outcomes, stating: "While the evidence is mixed, some studies
have concluded that this change in the scope of review formula has in fact changed
the outcome of cases.").
24. Thomas A. Mayes, Perry A. Zirkel, & Dixie Snow Huefner, Allocating the
Burden of Proofin Administrative and JudicialProceedings Under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 36, 41-42 (2005). The
IDEA is not unique in this regard. For example, Congress adopted a similar
procedure for the review of vocational rehabilitation decisions. See, e.g., Thomas
A. Mayes, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL
LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION 860, 861-62 (Fenwick W. English, ed., 2006).

25. Mayes et al., supra note 24, at 36, 41-42.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(viii).
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Supreme Court, courts reviewing IDEA administrative decisions
must give "due weight" to the administrative proceedings;27 however,
courts have differed in how much "weight" is "due. 28
From this discussion, it is clear that deference matters. 29 Whether
a reviewing court decides to defer to agency action is important.
Assuming a reviewing court decides to defer to agency action, the
degree to which it does so matters. The task for reviewing courts and
the litigants before them is to determine when and how much
deference is in order.
Regardless of whether and how much deference is due in a
particular situation, it is important to remember that the concept of
judicial deference to agency interpretations of law is impossible to
sever from administrative law and its principles. The key rationales
for deferring to administrative agencies are the same reasons for the
very existence of administrative agencies: agency subject matter
expertise and policy-making prerogatives. 30 To question the idea of
deference is, by inevitable extension, to question the very reason for
administrative law. 31 To the extent a reviewing court accords little or
no deference to an agency decision, that reviewing court must act
within in its area of superiority and not trespass on the agency's area
32
of superiority.
II.

DEFERENCE UNDER FEDERAL LAW

Although the concept of deference is key to an understanding of
judicial review of agency action, the term is not defined in the federal
Administrative Procedure Act ( "APA").3 3 The APA instead refers to
the role of the courts in interpreting statutory provisions, stating that

27. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 22.
29. See supra notes 20 to 28 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 15 to 20 and accompanying text.
31. Cf May, supra note 16, at 436.
32. See, e.g., Elliott Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2006) (discussing the "relative institutional competencies
of courts and administrative agencies"); Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1563 (2007) (discussing lower courts' adoption of the
"agency expertise" aspect of Chevron).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
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"the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the
34
action."
agency
an
of
terms
the
of
meaning or applicability
Elaboration on the deference concept has been left to the courts.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated several approaches
to determining whether deference is warranted and, if it is, the level
of deference due to agency interpretations of law. These approaches
shed light on state approaches to deference and on the deference
provisions adopted by the Iowa legislature in 1998.
A. Skidmore
More than half a century ago, the United States Supreme Court
articulated an approach to deference that has continued to guide state
courts. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 35 the Court was asked to decide
the correctness of an agency interpretation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Court held the agency's interpretations were not
36
controlling authority but persuasive authority entitled to respect.
The court reasoned that "the [a]dministrator's policies are made in
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience
and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a
judge in a particular case."37
The same themes emerge in state case law. Courts defer to
agency interpretations of their enabling statute because agencies, as
arms of the executive branch, are in a better position to make policy

34. Id. In attempting to reconcile this provision with the deference routinely
afforded agencies in interpreting the law, Anthony states:
Only where the agency has complied substantively and
procedurally with the statutes conferring lawmaking authority
can the reviewing court's interpretive authority under [section]
706 be diminished by the fact that the agency has made an
interpretation. In the absence of such authority or its execution,
the court must implement [section] 706 by making its own
interpretation, according the agency view such weight as it may
deserve under Skidmore.
Anthony, supra note 1, at 25-26.
35. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 139.
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choices; 38 agencies have expertise in these areas 39 and courts do not;
and agencies have broad investigative powers that courts lack.4 °
At least one commentator has argued that an ad hoc application
of the Skidmore factors, without affording any deference to an
agency interpretation, is inadvisable. Professor Rossi maintains that
this approach "has introduced even more confusion into the maze of
41
cases regarding judicial review of agency interpretations of law."
At the same time, he has recognized that the Skidmore test "appears
notably more rigorous than the routine reasonableness inquiry at
Chevron's step two" and should be used in conjunction with that
*
42
inquiry.
In hi
his view, "Skidmore's other factors, relating to
consistency and the contemporaneousness of the construction, add an
additional layer of scrutiny to the hard-look inquiry for informal
statements.

43

The United States Supreme Court revived Skidmore in recent
opinions, adopting an approach consistent with that advanced by
Professor Anthony. He suggested that courts should apply the
Skidmore factors where neither express nor implied Congressional
authority has been delegated to agencies to interpret their statutes.44
Iowa's amended APA reflects this approach. In Iowa Code
section 17A. 19(11)(b), the legislature afforded courts the opportunity
to defer to agency views of matters, even in the absence of a statutory
delegation of authority to consider those matters. 45 In commenting
on this section, Professor Bonfield stated:
38. See Sterlingworth Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Natural Res., 556 N.W.2d
791, 798-99 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
39. See, e.g., Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 654 A.2d 449, 458-59 (Md. 1995);
Consolation Nursing Home v. Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 648 N.E.2d
1326, 1328 (N.Y. 1995); Lefton Iron & Metal Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 529
N.E.2d 610, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Morton v. Mo. Air Conservation Comm'n,
944 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
40. See Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 914 A.2d 477, 485 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2007).
41. Rossi, supra note 16, at 1110; see also Womack, supra note 20, at 294
(stating "the only certain result of the Supreme Court's decision was the resulting
uncertainty"). For a detailed discussion of Chevron, see infra Part II.B.
42. Rossi, supra note 16, at 1143.
43. Id.
44. Anthony, supra note 16, at 56.
45. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(11)(b) (2007).
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There will inevitably be some situations in which the matters
being reviewed that have not been vested in agency
discretion are highly technical, requiring special expertness
for adequate comprehension, and the agency has that
expertness and the reviewing court does not. In those
situations the reviewing court may feel that it must give some
special weight
to the agency's view in order to make a sound
46
decision.
These are the same factors cited in Skidmore as grounds for
47
affording respect to agency interpretations of law.
B. Chevron
An oft-cited opinion on deference is Chevron, USA Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.4 8 Forty years after Skidmore,

the Supreme Court again confronted the questions of whether and
when to defer to an agency construction of law. The precise question
before the Court was whether the Environmental Protection Agency
reasonably construed a statutory term in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.49 For purposes of this article, the Court's
answer to this substantive question is of less import than its
articulation of an approach to arriving at an answer. The Court
prescribed a test that has been variously referred to as the "two-part
test, ' ' 50 the "step-two reasonableness inquiry,"' 51 the "three-stage

analysis," 52 and the "counter-Marbury test.",53 As an initial matter,
ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, AMENDMENTS TO IOWA ADMINISTRATIVE
46.
PROCEDURE ACT (1998), CHAPTER 17A, CODE OF IOWA (HOUSE FILE 667 As
ADOPTED): REPORT ON SELECTED PROVISIONS TO IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

72 (1998).
47. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
48. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
For a discussion of the volume of scholarship citing Chevron, see Andersen, supra
note 1, at 960.
AND IOWA STATE GOVERNMENT

49. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.

50. See, e.g., Womack, supra note 20, at 298.
51. Rossi, supra note 16, at 1112.
52. Anthony, supra note 16, at 17.
53. Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury": Reconciling Skidmore
Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
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the Court simply required courts and agencies to give effect to
"unambiguously expressed" legislative intent.54 Next, the Court
addressed the question of what level of deference to afford agency
interpretations where Congress "has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue.
Departing from the "persuasive
authority" standard it articulated in Skidmore, the Court stated it
"does not simply impose its own construction on the statute," but
determines "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
56
construction of the statute."
The Court articulated two levels of deference depending on the
nature of the statutory delegation of authority to the agency. 57 Where
Congress explicitly left a legislative gap for an agency to fill through
regulations, the Court concluded the regulations would be "given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. 58 Where the legislative delegation was
implicit, the Court stated "a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
59
made by the administrator of an agency."
It is worth noting that, although the Court began with a focus on
the nature of statutorily delegated authority rather than the
characteristics of an agency, and determined that an agency
interpretation could be "controlling" rather than simply "persuasive,"
the Court did not abandon the Skidmore factors. It reaffirmed those
factors, including the role of legislators or administrators in
formulating policy, the technical and complex nature of the
regulatory scheme, and the agency's ability to consider the matter in
60
greater detail than courts.

54. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
55. Id. at 843.
56. Id. at 842-43.
57. See, e.g., Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Disclosure of Special
Education Students' Records: Do the 1999 IDEA Regulations Mandate that
Schools Comply with FERPA?, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 455, 463-64 n.30 (2000) ("The
differing language suggests a different scope of judicial inquiry.").
58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
59. Id. at 844.
60. Id. at 865.
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State courts have regularly cited the Chevron test but have
applied it in different ways.61 Chevron is key to understanding
Iowa's 1998 APA amendments. Those amendments, 62 prescribing
when and how much to defer to agency views, clarify that the starting
63
point for an analysis of deference is the agency's enabling statute.
Professor Bonfield's commentary on one of the judicial review
provisions is instructive:
[W]here the General Assembly clearly delegates
discretionary authority to an agency to interpret or
elaborate a statutory term based on the agency's own
special expertness, the court may not simply substitute
its view as to the meaning or elaboration of the term
for that of the agency but, instead, may reverse the
agency interpretation or elaboration only if it is
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or an 64abuse of
discretion-a deferential standard of review.
C. Auer
This brings us to Auer v. Robbins,65 an opinion that expanded the
deference afforded to agency interpretations of law. At issue was an
agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation. 66 The
agency interpretation was not packaged in the usual rule format or
indeed, in an informal ruling or bulletin. Instead, the interpretation
was formulated in a legal brief filed with the United States Supreme
61. See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing state cases); see also William R.
Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and A Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1017 (2006).
62. Iowa House File 667, 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1202.
63. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 62 (explaining when a court should interpret
a statute de novo and when a court may not simply substitute its interpretation for
the interpretation of an agency). See also Anthony, supra note 16, at 26 (noting
both prongs of the second step of Chevron [the express delegation prong and the
implied delegation prong] call "for a reviewing court to find an appropriate
delegation before the court becomes bound to accept an agency interpretation on
the basis of its reasonableness").
64. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 62.
65. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
66. Id. at 454-55.
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Court in pending litigation. Despite this fact, the Supreme Court
stated the interpretation is "controlling"
unless "plainly erroneous or
67
inconsistent with the regulation."
Some federal circuit courts have declined to apply Auer. In
Eastman Kodak v. STWB, Inc.,68 for example, Judge Calabresi of the
Second Circuit noted that Auer was "seemingly undercut" by the
United States Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Christensen v.
HarrisCounty.69 The Fifth Circuit accepted the agency interpretation
after applying the "persuasive" standard of Skidmore.70 Similarly, in
Houston Police Officers' Union v. City of Houston, Judge Jones of
the Fifth Circuit questioned whether, after the post-Auer opinion of
Mead, pronouncements contained in an opinion letter and an amicus
'
brief "are sufficiently authoritative to merit Chevron deference. "71
Likewise, in Keys v. Barnhart, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
commented, "[i]t is odd to think of agencies as making law by means
of statements made in briefs, since agency briefs, at least below the
Supreme Court level, normally are not reviewed by the members of
the agency itself; and it is odd to think of Congress delegating
lawmaking power to unreviewed staff decisions. 72

67. Id. at 461. Contrast this holding with Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988). In Bowen, the Court explained that it never applied
Chevron deference "to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by
regulations" because "Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not
to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory
commands." (quoting Inv. Co. Ins. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971)). Cf
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51
(1991). See also Anthony & Asimow, supra note 1, at 10-11 (stating Auer
"authorize[d] the agencies to make law through an informal format where Congress
has not delegated such power either explicitly or by implication"). Anthony and
Asimow further state that the standard was "even more deferential than Chevron
because it seems to require the courts to uphold an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation without regard to whether it is reasonable." Id. at 11.
68. Eastman Kodak v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 222 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006).
69. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). For a detailed
discussion of the approach to deference taken in this opinion, see Rossi, supra note
16.
70. Eastman Kodak, 452 F.3d at 222 n.8.
71. Houston Police Officers' Union v. City of Houston, 330 F.3d 298, 305
(5th Cir. 2003).
72. Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 993-94 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Other federal courts have had no trouble applying the Auer
approach where they reviewed agency interpretations of their own
of
ambiguous regulations rather than agency interpretations
74
statutes; 73 however, this rationale has been subject to criticism.
In our view, there is little room for Auer in Iowa's approach to
deference. As noted, that approach begins with the enabling statute
and the concept of statutory delegation of authority to the agency, 75 a
concept that is given short shrift in Auer. The commentary to Iowa's
amended APA provides that a deferential standard of review is
warranted only as follows:
[T]he reviewing court, using its own independent
judgment and without any required deference to the
agency's view, must have a firm conviction from
reviewing the precise language of the statute, its
context, the purpose of the statute, and the practical
considerations involved, that the legislature actually
intended (or would have intended had it thought about
the question) to delegate to the agency interpretive
over the
power with the binding force of law
76
elaboration of the provision in question.
The view that agencies may exercise their delegated authority
only in formats that have the binding force of law is one that the
United States Supreme Court has since embraced, but not adopted, in
Mead77 and Gonzales v. Oregon. 8
73. See, e.g., Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 930-31 (9th Cir. 2006);
Humanoids Group v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 2004). It has been
pointed out that this is a distinction without a difference. The Supreme Court, 1999
Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 369, 378 (2000) (suggesting there is
little reason "to presume Congress intended one measure of deference for agency
interpretations of statutes and another for agency interpretations of regulations.").
74. See supra notes 68-72.
75. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 17A.23.
76. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 63 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Einer
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027, 2139 (2002) (discussing "force of law" concept); Kristin Hickman, The Need
for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in JudicialDeference, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1537 (2006) (same).
77. See infra Part II.D.
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D. Mead
In United States v. Mead Corp., the issue before the Court was
whether a tariff classification ruling, issued by the United States
Customs Service without notice and comment, deserved judicial
deference. 80 The Court began by specifying the type of delegated
authority that would trigger Chevron deference to an agency
interpretation:
"We hold that administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
8
authority." '
The Court continued, "[d]elegation of such authority may be
shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice - and - comment rulemaking, or by some other
indication of a comparable congressional intent." 82 The Court
emphasized, however, that the absence of such a formal process was
83
not determinative on the delegation question.
Applying these principles, the Court acknowledged that the
statute at issue conferred rulemaking authority upon the Customs
Service but concluded this authority was insufficient to find an
implied delegation of authority to issue tariff classifications. 84 The

78. See infra Part II.E.
79. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
80. Id. at 221.
81. Id. at 226-27.
82. Id. at 227.
83. Id. at 231. One commentator has stated that Mead leaves open for further
consideration two major questions: "[H]ow should the courts determine whether
Congress has delegated to an agency the requisite administrative authority;" and
"[E]ven if the requisite delegation exists, which interpretive processes represent
exercises of such congressionally delegated authority?" Hickman, supra note 76,
at 1601. We believe Mead establishes a framework that allows these holes to be

filled on a case-by-case basis through an analysis of the enabling statute at issue
and the agency action subject to review.
84. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32.

Fall 2007

The Role of Deference in Judicial Review

Court stated the classification rulings were "beyond the Chevron
pale. 85
While declining to afford the ruling Chevron deference, the Court
found Skidmore deference was warranted. It explained that agencies
make a variety of "interpretive choices" in administering their own
statutes that might warrant deference depending on "the degree of the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and
to the persuasiveness of the agency's position." 86 In the Court's
view, these reasons for affording deference, first articulated in
Skidmore, are still viable. 87 In concert with Anthony's view, 88 the
court explained that "Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable
where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to delegate general
authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority
was not invoked." 89
Mead begins with the concept of statutory delegation and ends
with a recognition that, even without express or implied delegation,
there may be cogent reasons to defer to an agency's interpretations of
its own statute. 90 The deference provisions of Iowa's amended APA
adopt the same approach. 91

Id. at 234.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 235.
Anthony states:
The way to reconcile Chevron with § 706 is to recognize in each case
that other statutes may bear upon the court's decisional duties under §
706. Since Congress in the APA has directed generally that the reviewing
court interpret the statute, that court must interpret the statute unless
Congress has directed otherwise through other statutes pertinent to the
case. Statutes direct otherwise if they have delegated lawmaking authority
to the agency and the agency has exercised it. Then the court under § 706
interprets those statutes and determines the effect of the agency's action
under them.
Anthony, supra note 1, at 24.
89. Id. at 237.
90. Womack refers to Mead as "a fault line in administrative law." Womack,
supra note 20, at 290.
91. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 17A.19(l 1)(b); BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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E. Gonzales v. Oregon
We turn next to Gonzales v. Oregon.92 The Court framed the
issue as follows: "The question before us is whether the Controlled
Substances Act allows the United States Attorney General to prohibit
doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted
suicide, notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure." 93 As
in Chevron, the answer to the substantive question is9 4 less pertinent
for our purposes than the approach taken by the Court.
The Court reaffirmed the limited applicability of Auer. As in
Auer, the Court was reviewing a federal statute, interpreted by a
federal rule which, in turn, was the subject of informal interpretation.
Citing Auer, the Court reiterated that "[a]n administrative rule may
receive substantial deference if it interprets the issuing agency's own
ambiguous regulation." 95 However, the Court stated the regulation
subject to interpretation in Gonzales was simply a restatement of the
statute itself, rather than a regulation promulgated with the aid of the
agency's expertise and experience as was the case in Auer.96 In the
Court's view, an interpretation of a "parroting regulation" such as
this was not entitled to Auer deference because the agency was in fact
simply interpreting the statute. 97 The Court cited Chevron but found
Chevron deference unwarranted based on the rationale used in Mead,
and ultimately chose to afford the Attorney General's interpretive
98
rule only Skidmore deference.
Gonzales demonstrates a clear move away from the broad
standard of deference articulated in Auer.99 Notably, the Court
distanced itself based on the content of the regulation subject to

92. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
93. Id. at 248.
94. For articles discussing the substance of the Gonzalez decision, see, e.g.,
George J. Annas, Congress, Controlled Substances, and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Elephants in Mouseholes, 354 N. ENG. J. MED. 1079 (2006); Theodore
Ruger, Gonzales v. Oregon and the Supreme Court's (Re)Turn to Constitutional
Theory, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 817 (2006).
95. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 254-55.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 257.
98. Id. at 296-97.
99. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
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00
interpretation rather than the informal format of the interpretation.
The fact that the interpretation was in an interpretive rule format was
apparently not deemed significant in the Court's analysis of Auer.
Equally instructive is the Court's consideration of Chevron
deference. As in Mead, the Court expressed an unwillingness to read
the statutory delegation of authority to promulgate rules as a
0
delegation of authority to issue this particular interpretive rule.' '

Instead, the Court opted to afford the interpretive rule Skidmore
deference and found the rule unpersuasive under that standard. 102 As
Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the majority again did not
"take issue with the Solicitor General's contention that no alleged
procedural defect, such as the absence of notice-and-comment
rulemaking before promulgation of the Directive, renders Chevron
'0 3
inapplicable here."'
Mead, together with Gonzales, instructs that it is not simply
enough to search for a provision that confers rule-making authority
upon the agency. The reviewing court must also determine whether
the agency interpretation falls within the ambit of that rule-making
authority. Iowa's amended APA makes this distinction. To warrant
a deferential standard of review, an agency must have "clearly"
delegated "interpretive power with the binding
force of law over the
'0 4
question."'
in
provision
the
elaboration of

100. In Christensen, the Court declined to afford Auer deference to an
agency's opinion letter, on the ground that the regulation the agency sought to
interpret in that letter was not ambiguous. Christensen , 529 U.S. 576. For more
information, see, e.g., Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference for Agency Interpretationsof Law, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 49, 145-46 (2000) (discussing difference between interpretive rules and other
informal formats).
101. See Robert Kundis Craig, Supreme Court News, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Spring 2006, at 22 (noting "the majority's profound skepticism that
Congress had authorized the Attorney General to make independent judgments
about the medical profession and to criminalize doctors' behavior when that
behavior was legal under state law").
102. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at268-69 see Joseph Cordaro, Who Defers to Whom?
The Attorney General Targets Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2477, 2481 (2002) (advocating this standard).
103. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 63.
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F. Critiqueof the Supreme Court's Cases
The tests summarized above have all been subject to some
criticism. In our view, the approach articulated in Mead is most
consistent with Iowa's approach to deference, as clarified and
codified in the 1998 amendments to the APA. 10 5 We recognize at
least one commentator's critique of Mead. Professor Aprill suggests:
Insofar as Mead calls for rejecting Seminole Rock and Auer, it has
the effect of limiting the administrative interpretive voice. The
justification for deference to administrative interpretations of
regulations rests in part on the need to hear the administrative voice
and its distinctive accents. The reasoning of Mead mutes this point
10 6
of view.
In our view, Mead enhances the "administrative voice" by giving
that voice deference only when it is truly the "administrative voice."
In other words, when the agency speaks with authority delegated to it
by a legislative body in a format that carries the force of law, the
agency's voice is entitled to deference. On the other hand, if the
format in which the agency interpretation is presented raises doubt
about whether it is the agency speaking, that interpretation is entitled
07
to limited or no deference.1
III. DEFERENCE UNDER "MODEL" STATE LAWS

A. The Model State Administrative ProcedureAct (1961)
The 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961
MSAPA) 10 8 has been adopted, in whole or in part, in at least thirty

105. Cf Andersen, supra note 1, at 1032.
106. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2105 (citing Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F. 3d. 990 (7th

Cir. 2003)).
107. See Keys, 347 F.3d at 993 (stating "[pirobably there is little left of
Auer"); see also Anthony, supra note 16, at 5 (stating "[t]he touchstone in every

case is whether Congress intended to delegate to the agency the power to interpret
with the force of law and the particular format that was used.").
108. Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Revised 1961 Act, 15 U.L.A.
174 (2000) (hereinafter "1961 MSAPA").
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states.10 9 Like its predecessor, the 1946 MSAPA, the 1961 Act
provides a framework "with only enough detail to support general
principals."1 0 The 1961 MSAPA contains the following section on
scope of review, with operative but not always necessarily explicit
"deference" language:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence or
questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the
decision if substantial rights of appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) arbitrary and capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion. 11

The 1961 MSAPA is a "model act," not a "uniform act", with an
understanding that the adopting states would fashion it to their own
needs."1 2 The states have not been "uniform" in their adoption of the
"model" language. 13
Along with variety in the adoption of the 1961 MSAPA, there has
been variance in judicial interpretation of the state statutes drawn
from or based upon the 1961 MSAPA. Among this variety, one may
109.

Gedid et al., supra
13 (1965)).
110. Id.
111. 1961 MSAPA § 15(g), 15
112. Gedid et al., supra note
Procedure Act, Draft for Discussion

note 7 (citing 1

FRANK

COOPER,

STATE

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

113. 15A U.L.A. 1 (2000).

U.L.A. 12 (2000).
7 (citing Revised Model State Administrative
Only, at 1 (2006)).
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discern certain themes. The cases generally state the action of the
agency under review is presumed to be correct.' 14 The showing
required to disturb an agency decision varies among the states.
Concerning findings of fact, the cases, following the statute's
language," 5 indicate courts will defer to an agency's findings in an
area of its expertise. " 6 The cases also reflect that courts will give
deference to agency answers regarding mixed questions of law and
fact,1 7 although this is not a unanimous view. 118 One court stated
agency conclusions of law that are closely related to findings of fact
are entitled to deference and are not disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence. 19 The cases indicate courts will defer to an
agency's assessment of witness credibility, 20 unless there are "strong
reasons" not to do so, 12 ' and will defer to agency decisions that are
22
interwoven with determinations of policy and value. 1
Concerning deference to conclusions of law, the decisions under
the various adoptions of the 1961 MSAPA are less uniform. Some
courts hold that agency conclusions of law receive no deference on
124
judicial review,' 23 including interpretations of appellate case law.
114. Erb v. Md. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 676 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996).
115. 1961 MSAPA § 15(g)(5), 15A U.L.A. 395 (2000).
116. See, e.g., Lefton Iron & Metal Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 529
N.E.2d 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Morton v. Mo. Air Conservation Comm'n, 944
S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
117. See, e.g., XL Disposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 709 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999); accord S. Foods Group, L.P. v. State Dep't of Educ., 974 P.2d 1033 (Haw.
1999); Ashleson v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 573 N.W.2d 554 (Wisc. Ct.
App. 1997).
118. Ottema v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 968 P.2d 41 (Wyo.
1998) (will defer to findings of fact but will correct applications of law).
119. Campbell v. Nev. Tax Comm'n, 853 P.2d 717 (Nev. 1993).
120. See, e.g., Envirotest Sys. Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 757 A.2d
1202 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847 (D.C.
1994).
121. Dep't of Mental Health & Hygiene v. Shrieves, 641 A.2d 899, 905 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
122. See, e.g., Stirlingworth Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't of Natural Res., 556
N.W.2d 791, 799 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1996).
123. See, e.g., Rouse-Fairwood Ltd. P'ship v. Supervisor of Assessments, 708
A.2d 19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Kurtenbach v. Frito-Lay, 563 N.W.2d 869
(S.D. 1997); Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 962 P.2d 876

Fall 2007

The Role of Deference in Judicial Review

One court provided the following test: an agency's conclusions of
those conclusions
law receive no "special deference," at least where
' 25
have not been subject to prior "judicial scrutiny."'
These cases aside, the weight of authority suggests courts will
defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute it is tasked with
administering (assuming such interpretation is necessary' 26) that is
both reasonable and consistent with the statute,' 27 especially when
that interpretation is rooted in the agency's expertise.' 28 One court
indicated it would defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute it
is to administer unless a party made a "compelling" showing the
agency misinterpreted the statute. 129 The deference owed to an
agency interpretation of law is heightened when the agency draws on
its expertise. 30 Other authorities grant deference to an agency's
decision whether to issue new regulations,1 3' and to an agency's
interpretation of its existing regulations.' 3 2 Some authorities suggest

(Wyo. 1998); see also Nessel v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 664 N.E.2d 207,
208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (not bound to give deference); Tex-Con Oil & Gas Co. v.
Batchelor, 634 So.2d 902, 907 (La. Ct. App. 1993) ("little or no deference").
124. Motola v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 580 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Wisc.
1998).
125. Casey v. Ne. Utils., 731 A.2d 294, 297 (Conn. 1999). It is not clear from
the text of this opinion whether or how special deference is distinguishable from
garden variety deference.
126. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Labor &
Indus. Review Comm'n, 456 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (no need to
consider an agency's interpretation when a statute is unambiguous).
127. See, e.g., Boer v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 564 A.2d
54 (D.C. 1989); Hewet v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 814 P.2d 424 (Idaho 1991); Parasi
v. Jenkins, 603 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Adrian Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Pub.
Sch. Employees Ret. Bd., 582 N.W.2d 767 (Mich. 1998).
128. See, e.g., Ontario County v. Capital Dist. Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp.,
545 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
129. Lemieaux v. Tri-State Lotto Comm'n, 666 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Vt. 1995).
130. See, e.g., OntarioCounty, 545 N.Y.S.2d 643.
131. Fogle v. H & G. Rest., Inc., 654 A.2d 449 (Md. 1995); accord
Consolation Nursing Home v Comm'r of N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 648 N.E.2d
1326 (N.Y. 1995).
132. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Burke, 645 A.2d 495 (Vt. 1993).
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an agency conclusion of law is entitled to "great bearing" when the
question is one of first impression.133
Nevertheless, even jurisdictions that generally defer to agency
interpretations of law set limits on this deference. For example, an
agency's decision is afforded less deference when it "drastically"
departs from that agency's prior practice. 13 4 One court indicated the
concept of deference to agency interpretations of law did not
encompass arguments the agency makes in litigation.'35 Other cases
do not grant deference to agency regulations outside of the agency's
sphere of special expertise.' 36 Finally, an irrational determination is
37
entitled to no deference. 1
When the question of law under review turns from one of
"substance" to one of "procedure," the courts in jurisdictions
adopting the 1961 MSAPA are less likely to grant deference. While
38
an agency's procedural rules are generally entitled to deference,'
an agency's determination of whether it complied with the
39
administrative procedure act is not entitled to deference.
Similarly, an agency's determination of its own powers is entitled to
40
no deference.
The recent cases construing the 1961 MSAPA illustrate the
tension between Professor Aprill's "administrative voice" and
142
"judicial voice, 141 which may occur within the same jurisdiction.

133. See, e.g., Finnel v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 519
N.W.2d 731, 734 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
134. See, e.g., Bus. & Prof'1 People for Pub. Int. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n,
555 N.E.2d 693, 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); but see Viking Pump, Inc. v.
Employment Appeal Bd., 522 N.W.2d 310 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (agency precedent
does not bind reviewing court).
135. Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 465 S.E.2d 399 (W. Va. 1995).
136. Indus. Liaison Comm. v. Williams, 527 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1988);
Pickering v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 456 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990).
137. Paramount Comm'n v. Gibraltar Cas. Co., 685 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 1997).
138. See, e.g., Biddleford Bd. of Educ. v. Biddleford Teachers Ass'n, 688
A.2d 922 (Me. 1997).
139. See, e.g., Gasoline Marketers of Vt., Inc. v. Agency of Natural Res., 739
A.2d 1230 (Vt. 1999).
140. See, e.g., GTE N., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 500 N.W.2d 284, 286
(Wisc. 1993).
141. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
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For example, in one case the Illinois Appellate Court states that
courts are not bound to give deference to agency conclusions of
law.143 In a different case, the same court stated the judiciary should
give "great weight" to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a
statute. 144 While these two cases are not necessarily inconsistent,
they do appear to have different starting points: the former giving
primacy to the "judicial voice" and the latter giving primacy to the
"administrative voice." Furthermore, both cases can lay claim to
having a foundation in the statute's text, as the express language of
the statute 45 is silent on when or whether to defer to agency
conclusions of law and, if deference is due, how much deference is
due.
B. The Model State Administrative ProcedureAct (1981)
The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981
MSAPA) 146 has been adopted, in whole or in part, in three states,
with other states adopting selected provisions.147 The 1981 MSAPA
148
is more detailed than its 1961 predecessor.
The 1981 MSAPA contains the following operative "deference"
language:
The court shall grant relief only if it determines that a
person seeking judicial relief has been substantially
prejudiced by any one or more of the following:
(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied.

142. See supra notes 123, 127 and accompanying text.
143. Nessel v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 664 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
144. Parasi,603 N.E.2d at 566.
145. 1961 MSAPA § 15(g)(5), see generally 15A U.L.A. 1 (2000).
146. Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981), 15 U.L.A. 1 (2000)
(hereinafter "1981 MSAPA").
147. Gedid et al., supra note 7 (citing Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act, Draft for Discussion Only, at 2).
148. Id.
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(2) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any provision of law.
(3) The agency has not decided all issues requiring
resolution.
(4) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law.
(5) The agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure.
(6)
The persons taking the agency action were
improperly constituted as a decision-making body,
motivated by improper purpose, or subject to
disqualification.
(7) The agency action is based on a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed
in light of the whole record before the court, which
includes the agency record for judicial review,
supplemented by any additional evidence received by
the court under this Act.
(8) The agency action is:
(i) outside the range of discretion delegated to the
agency 'by any provision of law;
(ii) agency action, other than a rule, that is
inconsistent with a rule of the agency; [or]
(iii) agency action, other than a rule, that is
inconsistent with the agency's prior practice unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by stating facts and
reasons to demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency. [; or] [.]
arbitrary
or
(iv)
[otherwise
unreasonable,
capricious.]

149

The cases construing this language tend toward greater oversight
of administrative agency conclusions of law. While the judiciary will
not interfere with a matter vested in the agency's discretion, absent a

149. 1981 MSAPA § 5-116(c), 15 U.L.A. 145 (2000).
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showing of abuse, 5 ° and while agency action is presumed to be
correct, 51 that presumption does not apply to questions of law. 52 In
these jurisdictions, an agency's conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, 153 including independently determining the law in mixed
questions of law and fact.' 54 A court gives "weight" to an agency's
interpretation of a statute "only where the law is ambiguous and the
matter falls within the agency's expertise."' 155 If an agency's
expertise, the agency's
interpretation is outside of the agency's
56
interpretation is entitled to no deference. 1
Like the 1961 MSAPA, 157 the cases construing the 1981
MSAPA' 518 appear to reflect the discord between the "judicial voice"
and the "administrative voice."' 59 Like the 1961 MSAPA, 160 the
conflict between the two voices is, in large part, attributable to the
or when courts
1981 Act's lack of express language about whether
61
law.'
of
interpretations
should defer to agency
IV.

DEFERENCE UNDER THE

1998

AMENDMENTS TO IOWA'S

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

150. Concerned Citizens of Hosp. Dist. No. 304 v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 897 P.2d

1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
151. See, e.g., Multicare Med. Ctr. v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 790
P.2d 124 (Wash. 1990).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., RenalWest L.C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 943 P.2d 769 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1997); Klickitat County Citizens Against Imported Waste v. Klickitat
County, 860 P.2d 390 (Wash. 1993).
154. See, e.g., Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. City of Tucson, 972 P.2d 647 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1998); Valentine v. Dep't of Licensing, 894 P.2d 1352 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995).
155. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Gelman, 10 P.3d 475, 477 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)
(emphases added).
156. See, e.g., Cascade Court Ltd. P'ship v. Noble, 20 P.3d 997 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001).
157. See supra notes 114-45.
158. See supra notes 150-56.
159. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. 1981 MSAPA § 5-116(c), see generally 15 U.L.A. 144 (2000).
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The 1998 Amendments to the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act
162
were intended to address several inadequacies of the 1974 IAPA,
which, like the 1961 MSAPA on which it was partially based, was a
"first generation" APA. 163 While the Iowa State Bar Association's
taskforce on revision of the IAPA recommended repealing the 1974
IAPA and adopting a new act in its stead, 164 Iowa's Attorney General
and "several agencies then responded that they believed the current
IAPA was satisfactory and, therefore, that it should not be replaced
by an entirely new IAPA."' 165 From this dispute166came a compromise:
"a series of discrete amendments to" the IAPA.
A crucial portion of this compromise was a revision of the
IAPA's provisions concerning the scope of judicial review. 167 While
these provisions were "completely re-written" in the 1999
amendments, these revisions were not intended to "significantly alter
the delicate balance of judicial review in Iowa"'168 or to "increase the
intensity of review by the courts beyond that originally contemplated
by the language of the [1974] IAPA."' 169 Rather, the 1999 IAPA
amendments were a response to evidence that reviewing courts were
not applying the level of scrutiny intended by the 1974 IAPA.170 The
1999 IAPA amendments provided "much more specificity"' 7 1 to
reviewing courts, which "may mildly increase the intensity of judicial
review of agency action by the District Court."'' 72 According to
Professor Bonfield:

162. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2-6.
165. Id. at 6-7.
166. Pamela D. Griebel, New Standards of Judicial Review Under House File
667, Presentation to a Continuing Legal Education Event Sponsored by the Legal
Services Corporation of Iowa, at 3 (Oct. 22, 1999); see also BONFIELD, supra note
46, at 7-8.
167. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 59-73; Griebel, supra note 166, at 8-27.
168. Griebel, supra note 166, at 9.
169. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 59.

170. Id. at 59-60.
171. Id. at 60.

172. Id.
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The greater specificity is sought to be achieved by
elaborating in much more detail the substantive
content of the current standards of review to be
applied by the District Court, by stating explicitly the
exact circumstances in which the District Court is or is
not required to give deference to an agency's view of
a matter, and by filling in with express language some
of the legal principals applicable to the scope of
review that are not dealt with by the language of the
[1974] IAPA. 73
In subsequent sections, this Article explores these more specific
7 4
provisions, with a view to whether this "greater specificity"'
preserved the "delicate balance"' 75 between the "administrative
voice" and the "judicial voice. 176
A. Iowa Code section 1 7A.19(11)
The 1974 IAPA was silent on when courts were to defer to
administrative agencies, and "some of the cases appear unclear and
sometimes inconsistent."' 177 The 1998 amendments to the IAPA
codified prior law. 178 Iowa Code section 17A. 19(11) provides what
Pamela Griebel termed the "three golden rules" of judicial review of
agency action. 79
Section 17A. 19(11) provides:
In making the determinations required by subsection
10, paragraphs "a" through "n", the court shall do all
of
the
following:
a. Shall not give any deference to the view of the
agency with respect to whether particular matters have

173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Griebel, supra note 166, at 9.
176. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
177. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 70.

178. Id.; Griebel, supra note 166, at 15-16.
179. Griebel, supra note 166, at 14.
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been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of
the agency.
b. Should not give any deference to the view of the
agency with respect to particular matters that have not
been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of
the agency.
c. Shall give appropriate deference to the view of the
agency with respect to particular matters that have
been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of
80
the agency.'
Paragraph "a", stating an agency's view of its own power "shall
not" 181 be granted deference, codifies the generally accepted prior
rule in Iowa. 82 Professor Bonfield provides three reasons why this is
so: (1) the extent of an agency's power is a "purely legal issue that
was determined finally by the General Assembly and therefore that
was not delegated to the judgment of the agency;"' 183 (2) the
interpretation of statutes does not require any special agency
expertise; and (3) deferring to an agency's determination of its own
powers would "give deference to the view of a self interested party..
. and lessen the effectiveness of the courts
as a check on the exercise
184
by agencies of unauthorized powers."
Paragraph "b", stating that a reviewing court "should not" '85
defer to an agency's views on matters that have not been vested in its
discretion by a provision of law, 86 discourages but does not prohibit

180. IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(11) (2007).
181. Id. § 17A.19(11)(a).
182. Griebel, supra note 166, at 16 (citing Moderate Income Hous. v. Bd. of
Review, 393 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1986)).
183. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 71.
184. Id.
185. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(11)(b).
186. Griebel, supra note 166, at 15, notes "provision of law" is defined by the
1998 IAPA amendments as follows: "the whole or part of the Constitution of the
United States of America or the Constitution of the State of Iowa, or any federal or
state statute, court rule, executive order of the governor, or agency rule." IOWA
CODE § 17A.2(10n).

The Role of Deference in Judicial Review

Fall 2007

87
courts from granting deference to agencies in such situations.'
Deference in such circumstances should rarely be granted.' 88
Professor Bonfield provides one example:

There will inevitably be some situations in which
the matters being reviewed that have not been vested
in agency discretion are highly technical, requiring
special expertness for adequate comprehension, and
the agency has that expertness and the reviewing court
does not. In those situations the reviewing court may
feel that it must give some special weight to89the
agency's view in order to make a sound decision.'
In nearly all other cases, reviewing courts should give no
deference to an agency's views on a subject.
In Mosher v. Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals, the
supreme court determined that the Department was not vested with
the authority to interpret the state's statute on dependent adult abuse.
190 Citing Iowa Code section 17A. 19(1 1)(b), the Department asserted
that the court should still give deference to its interpretation of the
1
statute.' 9
The court rejected that argument, stating:
We do not think this appeal is one of those rare cases
in which we should ignore the legislature's general
directive to give no deference to the agency's view in
matters not involving agency discretion. The statutory
definitions are clear and detailed. They are not
"highly technical," and do not require "special
expertness for adequate comprehension." Therefore,
187. Griebel, supra note 166, at 16 ("Note that the operative word is "should"
not "shall."); see also BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 71 (same).
188. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72; see also Griebel, supra note 166, at 16
("Most decisions should not confer deference in this context.").
189. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72. On the similarity of this analysis to

Skidmore, see supra notes 45-47.
190. Mosher v. Iowa Dep't of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa
2003).

191. Id. at 510.
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we give no deference to the agency's view on the
92
issue of statutory interpretation.1
Paragraph "c" of the Iowa Code states that the reviewing courts
"shall give appropriate deference" to agency views on a matter, when
that matter has been vested by a provision of law. 9 3 This codifies
prior law.' 9 4 According to Professor Bonfield, a reviewing court that
did not give appropriate deference in such instances would be
violating the statute that committed the subject to the agency's
discretion. 9 5 This paragraph does not quantify the amount of
deference a reviewing court is to give; rather, it states only that
appropriate deference must be given. 196 The amount of deference
that is appropriate will depend on the nature of the agency action
97
under review and the specific grounds for judicial review. 1
9 8
In City of Marion v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance,'
the Iowa Supreme Court applied Iowa Code section 17A. 19(11) in
resolving a dispute about whether an Iowa city owed state sales tax
on revenues from the city's public swimming pool.1 99 State law
exempted "gross receipts from sales or services rendered, furnished,
or performed by a county or city" from state sales tax, but "fees" paid
to a county or city for "participating in any athletic sports" were
subject to state taxation. 20 0 The state had adopted an administrative
rule stating that swimming pool revenue was taxable, as swimming
192. Id. at 510-11 (quoting BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72, and citing
Harrison v. Employment Appeal Bd., 659 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Iowa 2003) (giving no
deference to Employment Appeal Board's interpretation of workplace drug testing
law)).
193. IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(11)(c).
194. Griebel, supra note 166, at 16 (citing, e.g., Madrid Home for the Aging
v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 557 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Iowa 1996)).
195. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.
196. Griebel, supra note 166, at 14.
197. Id.; see also BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.
198. City of Marion v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 643 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa
2002). For a brief discussion of this case, see Iowa City Had to Pay State's Sales
Tax On Admissions to Town Pool, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES, Oct. 2002,
at 45.
199. Id. at 205-06.
200. Id. at 206 (citing IOWA CODE 422.45(20) (1997)). This section was
recodified in 2003, and is now at IowA CODE section 423.3(32) (2007).
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was an "athletic sport." 20 1 The City of Marion had not paid sales tax
on admissions fees to its municipal pool, and the state sought to
collect over $23,000 in tax, penalties, and interest from the City. The
City sought judicial review, and the district court affirmed the
agency's decision.2 °2
The City argued the state's rule was an incorrect interpretation of
the statute.20 3 The supreme court turned to Iowa Code section
17A. 19(11) to analyze the City's argument. The court noted it "shall
not" give deference to the agency's view of its own powers,20 4 but
"should" give "appropriate deference" to the agency's view of a
matter "that [has] been vested by a provision of law in the discretion
of the agency. '20 5 The court noted that Iowa Code section 422.68(1)
granted the agency responsible for state sales tax "the power and
authority to prescribe all rules not inconsistent with the provisions of
this chapter, necessary and advisable for its detailed administration
and to effectuate its purposes." 20 6 The court determined this statute
20 7
vested the state with the discretion to enact the rule at issue.
Giving the agency's view deference, the supreme court affirmed the
judgment of the district court.20 8
City of Marion may reveal some tension between the
administrative and the judicial "voices."209 Section 17A.19(11)(c)
states that courts "shall" give "appropriate deference" to an agency's
views about matters vested by law in the agency's discretion.2 10
Under Iowa law, "shall" in a statute "imposes a duty."2 1' In City of
Marion, the court stated it merely "should" give deference in such
cases. 2 12 Whether intentional or not, the court in City of Marion
201. Id. (citing Iowa Admin. Code r. 701-18.39 (1997)).
202. Id. at 206.
203. Id. at 207.
204. Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 17A.19(1 1)(a)).
205. Id. (quoting and construing IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(1 1)(c)).

206. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 422.68(1)).
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v Dep't of Natural Res., 681
N.W.2d 596, 601-03 (Iowa 2004) (employing a similar analysis).
209. See Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
210. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(l1)(c).
211. Id. § 4.1(30)(a).
212. City of Marion, 643 N.W.2d at 207.
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subtly but appreciably departed from the statutory framework and
created potential for uncertain application of section 17A.19(11)(c),
213
the very confusion section 17A. 19(1 1) was intended to eliminate.
While the amount of "appropriate deference" refers to review based
on "the unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion
standard," 214 section 17A. 19(1 1) imposes a duty on reviewing courts
215
to give such "appropriate deference."
In contrast to the outcome in City of Marion, in Auen v. Alcoholic
Beverages Division,216 the Iowa Supreme Court was confronted by a
challenge to an amendment to an agency rule concerning the ability
(or, rather, the lack thereof) of an alcohol manufacturer, bottler, or
wholesaler to have an ownership interest in a business that retails
alcohol.2 17 The Alcoholic Beverages Division's proposed regulation
was purportedly implementing Iowa Code section 123.45, which
read:
A person engaged in the business of manufacturing,
bottling, or wholesaling alcoholic beverages, wine, or
beer, or any jobber, representative, broker, employee,
or agent of such a person, shall not . . . directly or
indirectly be interested in the ownership, conduct, or
operation of the business of another licensee or
permittee authorized under this chapter to sell at retail,
nor hold a retail liquor control license or retail wine or
beer permit.218

213. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.

214. Id.
215. IOWA CODE §§ 4.1(30)(a), 17A.19(1 1)(c). In Becker v. Iowa Department

of Human Services, 661 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 2003), the court cited IOWA CODE
section 4.6(6) (stating courts "may consider" "the administrative construction of
the statute" when construing an ambiguous statute) in upholding the Department's
rule implementing the state's adoption subsidy statute. The court did not engage in
the analysis found in IOWA CODE section 17A.19(10)-(11). There is a quantum
difference between "may consider" (IOWA CODE § 4.6(6)) and "shall give
appropriate deference" (Id. § 17A. 19(1 1)(c)).
216. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 2004).
217. Id. at 587-88.
218. IOWA CODE § 123.45(1999).
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The Alcoholic Beverages Division amended its implementing
rule 2 19 to "narrowly define 'interest' and to exclude remote corporate
connections that do not affect retail businesses directly or
indirectly." 220 A group of beer distributors challenged the rule,
which the district court upheld.2 2 '
On appeal, the supreme court reversed.2 2 2 The court noted the
legislature had vested the agency with the authority to "adopt rules
governing 'the conditions and qualifications necessary for the
obtaining of licenses and permits,"' which includes the authority to
interpret section 123.45.223 The court concluded, however, that the
division's "narrow" proposed rule was inconsistent with section
123.45's "bright line" rule.22 4 If a different standard for what
constitutes impermissible producer or wholesaler control of retail
alcoholic beverage outlets would be a public policy improvement,
that is a matter for the legislature, not the agency. 2 25 The court held:
"Because we conclude amended rule 185-16.2(2) is an illogical
interpretation of Iowa Code section 123.45, the district court erred in
upholding the rule. 22 6
While section 17A. 19(11)(c) describes when a court shall give
"appropriate deference" to the views of an agency, Iowa Code
section 17A.19(10) describes the level of deference that is
appropriate under different situations. 227 The two sections, which are
228
inseparable parts of a coherent whole, should be read together.
The next section of this article reviews section 17A. 19(1 o).229
B. Iowa Code 17A.19(10)

219. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 185-16.2(2) (2000).
220. Adopted and Filed, 23 Iowa Admin. Bull. 724 (2000).
221. Auen, 679 N.W.2d at 589.
222. Id. at 587.
223. Id. at 590 (quoting IOWA CODE § 123.21(11) (1999)); see also City of
Marion, 643 N.W.2d at 207, cited by the Auen court.
224. Auen, 679 N.W.2d at 592.
225. Id.

226. Id. at 592-93.
227. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(10).
228. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 61.
229. See infra Part IV.B.
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Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) is one of the provisions
"calculated to ensure that judicial review is an effective check on
'
illegal agency action."23
It provides, in relevant part:
The court may affirm the agency action or remand to
the agency for further proceedings. The court shall
reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from
agency action, equitable or legal and including
declaratory relief, if it determines that substantial
rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been
prejudiced because the agency action is any of the
following:
c.
Based upon an erroneous interpretation of a
provision of law whose interpretationhas not clearly
been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of
the agency.
f. Based upon a determination of fact clearly vested
by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency
that is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record before the court when that record is viewed as a
whole....
h. Action other than a rule that is inconsistent with the
agency's prior practice or precedents, unless the
agency has justified that inconsistency by stating
credible reasons sufficient to indicate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency.
1. Based upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable interpretation of a provision of law
whose interpretation has clearly been vested by a
provision of law in the discretion of the agency.
m. Based upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly

230. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 59.
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been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of
the agency.
n. Otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or
23
an abuse of discretion. '
The provisions "generally elaborate with further detail and
specificity" the scope of review provisions in the 1974 IAPA.2 32
233
They make no significant substantive changes.
One commentator refers to Iowa's standard of review as "a
modified version of the Chevron doctrine." 2 34 Rather than focusing
on whether a legislative delegation of interpretive power to an agency
is "explicit" or "implied, 2 3 5 the 1998 IAPA amendments direct the
reviewing courts to consider whether a provision of law "clearly
vested" that power in the agency's discretion. 236 Professor Bonfield
observes that "clearly" is a much less "restrictive" threshold than
"explicitly." 237 In determining whether a provision of law "clearly"
commits a matter to an agency's discretion, he offers the following
guidance:
This means that the reviewing court, using its own
independent judgment and without any required
deference to the agency's view, must have a firm
conviction from reviewing the precise language of the
statute, its context, the purpose of the statute, and the
practical considerations involved, that the legislature
actually intended (or would have intended had it
thought about the question) to delegate to the agency

231. IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(10) (emphases added).
232. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 61.

233. Id.
234. Griebel, supra note 166, at 19.
235. See supra Part II.B (discussing Chevron).
236. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 63 (discussing IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(10)).
237. Id. Griebel states this distinction, "as a practical matter ... is necessary."
Griebel, supra note 166, at 19. She notes: "Few statutes are as "express" as the
following example from the Consumer Fraud Act: "To accomplish the objectives
and to carry out the duties prescribed by this section, the attorney general ... may
promulgate such rules as may be necessary, which rules shall have the force of
law." Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 714.16(4)(a) (1999)).
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interpretive power with the binding force of law over
the elaboration of the provision in question.238
The Iowa Supreme Court addressed the issue of a "firm
conviction" in Mosher.239 There, the Department of Inspections and
it with the
Appeals (DIA) asserted the legislature had vested 240
discretion to interpret a statute on dependent adult abuse:
DIA argues it has been granted discretion to interpret the
statutory definitions set forth in chapter 235B for two
reasons: (1) it has broad regulatory authority over licensed
health care facilities pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 135C;
and (2) section 235B.3(l) places responsibility for "the
evaluation and disposition of dependent adult abuse cases
within health care facilities" on DIA. In considering DIA's
contention, we give no deference to its view that it has been
See Iowa Code §
accorded discretion in this area.
17A. 19(l 1)(a).24 1
The court rejected this argument. It first noted the authority to
regulate health facilities, conferred in Iowa Code chapter 135C,
"does not qualify as a legislative delegation of discretion to DIA" to
interpret the dependent adult abuse provisions contained in an
entirely different Code chapter. 242 Next, the court determined the
DIA's power to decide contested cases concerning dependent adult
abuse did not create a "firm conviction" the DIA had the discretion to
interpret the dependent adult abuse statute. 24 3 In fact, the court
concluded the legislature had "clearly vested" the Department of
Human Services with the authority to "elaborate on the statutory
definition of 'dependent adult,"' ' 2 " a fact wholly inconsistent with the
DIA's argument.
238. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 63.
239. Mosher, 671 N.W.2d at 508-10.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 509.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 510 (citing IOWA CODE § 235B.2(4)). For cases, in addition to City
of Marion, 643 N.W.2d 205, where the court found an agency to be "clearly
vested" with interpretive authority, see, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Employment
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In contrast, in Robinson v. State, the supreme court was
confronted by an agency rule stating the statute of limitations for
filing an action under the state's tort claims act would commence
after service of a notice of denial of the claim upon the claimant or
the claimant's attorney.245 The court concluded the legislature did
not clearly vest the agency with the "agency with interpretive powers
with respect to what type of notice is required to commence the
statute of limitations., 246 Even though the agency was not vested
with the discretion to interpret the tort claims act, the supreme court,
applying its own independent judgment, arrived at the same result as
the agency.247 Just as being "clearly vested" with discretion is no
guarantee that an agency's interpretation will be affirmed, 248 a lack of
such vesting is no guarantee the reviewing court will disagree with
the agency's interpretation.249
When the matter purportedly vested in the agency's discretion is
interpretation of the common law, the same analysis applies. In ABC
Disposal Systems, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, the
supreme court concluded the legislature did not empower the
Department of Natural Resources to "interpret or apply the common
law doctrine of equitable estoppel.,, 25 0

Also in ABC, the court

concluded it would give no deference to an agency's interpretation of
the state or federal constitution, "because it is exclusively up to the
judiciary to determine the constitutionality of legislation and rules
enacted by the other branches of the government. 25 '
The court's decision in ABC stands in marked contrast to its
decision in Zomer v. West River Farms,Inc.252 There, the issue was
whether the agency that administers the state's workers'
compensation program had the authority to reform the employer's
Appeal Bd., 722 N.W.2d 183, 193-94 (Iowa 2006); Thorns v. IPERS, 715 N.W.2d
7, 11 (Iowa 2006).
245. Robinson v. State, 687 N.W.2d 591, 595-96 (Iowa 2004).
246. Id. at 596.
247. Id.
248. See Auen, 679 N.W.2d 586.
249. Robinson, 687 N.W.2d at 595-96.
250. ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v Dep't of Natural Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 606
(Iowa 2004).
251. Id. at 605 (citing IOWA CODE § 17A.19(1 l)(b)).
252. Zomer v. W. River Farms, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 2003).
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workers' compensation insurance policy.253 The court, with only an
oblique and passing reference to Iowa Code chapter 17A (and no
reference to subsections 17A. 19(10) or 17A. 19(1 1)),254 concluded the
agency had such equitable powers. 5 It did so relying on Iowa Code
section 86.14(1), which states that, in a workers' compensation
contested case, "all matters relevant to a dispute are subject to
inquiry."256 From this "all matters" phrase, the court concluded the
agency had the ability to decide the meaning of a contract and, if
equitable principles warrant, reform the contract.257
In dissent, Justice Neuman stated: "I think it will come as a great
surprise to the workers' compensation commissioner that the agency
has not only the power to determine the legal effect of a contract ...
but to take the next step of reforming contracts based on equitable
principles.,

2 58

Zomer is an unusual case. While not necessarily disagreeing with
the Zomer court's ultimate conclusion, we disagree with the
methodology it employed. The Zomer court's ultimate conclusion
would have been strengthened by a more express reference to the
analysis contained in Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) and to Iowa
Code section 17A.23, which states agencies only have powers
59
2
conferred by law.

While in Zomer the supreme court concluded the state's workers'
compensation agency had the authority to reform a contract, the court
in Mycogen Seeds v. Sands concluded the same agency's under
certain provisions of the workers' compensation statute were not
entitled to deference. 26 0 The court stated:

253. Id. at 130.
254. Id. at 133.
255. Id. at 134-35.
256. Id. at 134 (citing IOWA CODE § 86.14(1)) (emphasis omitted).
257. Id. at 134-135.
258. Id. at 135 (Neuman, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). CompareZomer,
666 N.W.2d at 130, with Van Meter Indus. v. Mason City Human Rights Comm'n,
675 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 2004) (stating agency had no statutory authority to award
punitive damages under the Iowa Civil Rights Act).
259. IOWA CODE § 17A.23. According to Professor Bonfield, this section
"clearly and firmly restates current law. Agencies have no inherent powers."
BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 73.
260. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004).
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Here,
the
commissioner's
decision
regarding
apportionment of disability benefits, reimbursement of lost
wages, and penalty benefits is based upon statutory
interpretation. We see nothing in Iowa Code chapter 85 that
convinces us that the legislature has delegated any special
powers to the agency regarding statutory interpretation in
these areas. So such interpretation has not "clearly been
vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency."
• ..We therefore need not give the agency any deference
regarding its interpretation and are free to substitute
our
2 61
judgment de novo for the agency's interpretation.
The court, while giving no 62deference, ultimately arrived at the
2
same conclusion as the agency.
Mycogen Seeds is also subject to criticism. While nothing in
Iowa Code chapter 85 grants any discretion to interpret the workers'
compensation statutes to the agency, section 86.14(1) grants the
agency the power to inquire into "all matters relevant" to a workers'
compensation contested case.2 63 Chapter 86 also grants the agency
the power to "adopt and enforce rules necessary to implement this
chapter and chapters 85, 85A, 85B, and 87.•' 264 In our view, the
Zomer court may have strayed by over-reading section 86.14(1),
while the Mycogen Seeds court may have strayed by not considering
section 86.14(1) at all.
As in Zomer, we do not necessarily disagree with the Mycogen
Seeds court's ultimate conclusion. We disagree with the route
employed by the court in arriving at its ultimate conclusion. In
searching for whether the agency was "clearly vested" with the
discretion to interpret chapter 85, the court should have considered
relevant provisions of chapter 86. Confining its search to chapter 85
was too restrictive. Had it expanded the scope of its inquiry to
chapter 86, the Mycogen Seeds court would have had at least two
statutory sections to consider when determining whether the
legislature "clearly vested" the agency with the discretion to interpret
the statutes on apportionment, lost wages, and penalty benefits.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 468-69.
263. IOWA CODE § 86.14(1); see also Zomer,, 666 N.W.2d at 133-34 (Iowa
2003) (construing this section).
264. IOWA CODE § 86.8(1) (1998).
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Section 86.8(1),265 giving the agency the power to issue rules, would
not appear to apply to the interpretations of law at issue, as those
interpretations were not made through rule-making. 266 Section
86.14(1), on which the Zomer majority placed so much reliance, does
not appear to be a clear vesting of authority for the agency to
interpret the workers' compensation statute outside the context of
rulemaking in a way that would be entitled to deference. Section
86.14(1) refers to inquiries into relevant matters.2 67 This statute
outlines the nature of the record in a contested case and the agency's
duty to inquire about and evaluate "relevant" evidence. 268

It is

difficult to sensibly read this statute as doing anything else. It is
doubtful that the text of the statute, when it is read in its context
(including the statutory authority for the agency to make rules
concerning the workers' compensation statutes), 269 the statute
empowers the agency to interpret the workers' compensation statutes
in a manner entitled to deference or to equitably reform an insurance
policy.

2 70

Had Iowa's workers' compensation agency promulgated its
interpretations that were at issue in Mycogen Seeds in the form of a
rule, the interpretation would have been entitled to deference 27 1 in
light of section 86.8(1).272 This is one of many, reasons why

265. Id.
266. Mycogen Seeds cites no agency rules on these topics, Mycogen Seeds,
686 N.W.2d at 464, and the agency's administrative rules make scant mention of
the topics, see IOWA ADMIN. CODE rr. 1.1 et seq. Cf United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001) (stating statute authorizing an agency to make rules
does not provide sufficient implied authority to issue tariff classification decisions
that are entitled to deference).
267. IOWA CODE § 86.14(1).
268. Id.
269. Id. at § 86.8(1).
270. Cf Zomer, 666 N.W.2d at 131-34.
271. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(l1)(c).
272. Id. § 86.8(1). In P.D.S.I. v. Peterson, 685 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Iowa 2004),
the supreme court stated: "We see nothing in the workers' compensation statutes
that convinces us that the legislature has delegated any special powers to the
agency regarding its interpretation of case law or statutes." In our view, this
assertion, to the extent the agency promulgates regulations interpreting the
workers' compensation statutes, is suspect.
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agencies should, whenever possible, make law by rule rather than in
273
contested case decisions.

In the years governed by the 1998 IAPA amendments, there have
been some areas of confusion and uncertainty, 274 especially in areas
where the 1998 amendments restated and clarified prior law. This
confusion and uncertainty reveals a tension 275 between the
64276ithsbeou
"administrative"
and "judicial" voices.
However, it has been our
impression 277 that the 1998 IAPA amendments have accomplished
the

purpose

eliminating
litigants.

of "providing

"confusion" 279

much

greater

specificity

' 278

and

by courts, administrative agencies, and

V. LOOKING FORWARD

We began this article with the assertion that deference matters
and the level of deference may be outcome determinative. 280 Recent

273. See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation
and The Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 121 (1990). See
also Finch v. Schneider Specialized Carriers, 700 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 2005)
(construing IOWA CODE § 17A.19(10)(h)) ("The controlling legal standards are
those set out in the workers' compensation statutes and in this court's opinions, not
in prior agency decisions." Id. at 332.). We question whether the issue is as stated
by the Finch court. The issue under section 17A. 19(1 0)(h) might not be whether
the agency precedent was "controlling" but whether the agency's actions were
consistent - that is, whether the agency was treating similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner.
Professor Dotan explains why this is vital to the
administrative state: "In addition, consistency in decisionmaking serves as a vital
precondition for guaranteeing public faith in government. Finally, consistency in
administrative decisionmaking is congruent with the need to protect reasonable
expectations and reliance interests on behalf of members of the public." Yoav
Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 995, 1001 (2005).
274. See supra notes 252-73.
275. See supra notes 209-15.
276. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
277. The primary author has been a judge on the Iowa Court of Appeals since
1999. The secondary author, prior to joining the Iowa Department of Education,
was a staff attorney for the Iowa Court of Appeals.
278. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 60.
279. Id. at 72.
280. See supra Part I.
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federal precedent supports this assertion.28 1 In both Mead282 and
Gonzales,283 the Court determined that the agency interpretation was
simply persuasive authority under Skidmore.284 In both instances, the
result was that the interpretation was struck down. 285 Similarly, state
courts that afforded less deference to the agency interpretation of law
were more likely to find that interpretation unreasonable. 86
Given the importance of this concept to administrative law in
general and to administrative law outcomes specifically, 287 we
believe it is critical for legislatures to codify the notion of deference
so that courts and litigants know what to expect. 288 "In the current
state of affairs, deference doctrine simply does not help judges
decide, counselors counsel, and regulators plan. '289 The uncertainty
and oscillations of the federal 29° and state 29' case law, in spite of "an
avalanche of scholarly writing, ' 292 suggests the need for legislative
correction. 293 As Andersen states, "[i]f confusions persist despite
extensive critical analysis, we have an obligation to look harder for
other solutions. '"294

281. See supra Part II.
282. See supra Part II.D (discussing Mead).
283. See supra Part II.E (discussing Gonzales).
284. See supra Part II.A (discussing Skidmore).
285. See supra Parts II.D, II.E.
286. See supra Part III (discussing state cases).
287. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 1, at 961 ("Other than litigation, there
does not seem to be any practical way of predicting what a court will do with an
agency legal interpretation."); see also Andersen, supra note 61, at 1018 (stating
"the same problems of indeterminacy and confusion plaguing the federal Chevron
doctrine also exists at the state level").
289. Andersen, supra note 61, at 1030.
290. See supra Part II.
291. See supra Part Ill.
292. Andersen, supra note 1, at 960.
293. See, e.g., BONFIELD, supra note 46 (discussing Iowa's 1998 IAPA
amendments); Andersen, supra note 1 (proposing amendment to federal APA);
Andersen, supra note 61 (proposing additions to model state APA); Gedid et al.,
supra note 7 (discussing proposals for model state APA).
294. Andersen, supra note 1, at 961.
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Iowa has taken such a step in its amended APA,29 5 providing
express and concrete guidance on when courts "shall" defer, "shall
not" defer, and "should not" defer to agency matters under
consideration.2 96 The amendments also provide express and concrete
guidance on the levels of deference that should be afforded in
varying circumstances. 97 The amendments clarify for Iowans that
judicial review must begin with an analysis of: (1) the statute
delegating authority to the agency to administer the subject-matter of
that statute, and (2) the nature of the agency action subject to review.
We believe that Iowa's 1998 APA amendments may serve as a
model for other states. 298 As Professor Bonfield stated, Iowa's case
law contained seemingly inconsistent statements,299 reflecting the
acknowledged tension between a court's traditional role as arbiter of
the law and agencies' acknowledged role as experts in their fields.
Iowa's amendments provide a workable means of accommodating
this tension 30 0 (which is also reflected in the case law of many other
states), 3"' and they attempt to harmonize the administrative and
judicial voices.

302

In a recent discussion draft of a proposed model state APA, the
drafters included language from Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) as
one of the scope-of-review options for states to consider. 30 3 We
believe the drafters should consider including language from Iowa
Code section 17A. 19(11) as well. While the discussion draft
indicates that courts, under either scope-of-review options, could
defer to the agency legal conclusions,30 4 we believe this does not

295. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(10)-(11) (2007).
296. Id. § 17A.19(l1).
297. Id. § 17A.19(10).
298. See, e.g., Gedid et al., supra note 7 (noting proposed MSAPA contains
language adopted from IOWA CODE section 17A. 19(10)).
299. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 70.
300. Id. at 72.
301. See supra Part III; see also Andersen, supra note 61.
302. Aprill, supra note 1, at 2128.
303. Gedid et al., supra note 7 at 72-75 (citing Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, Draft for Discussion Only, at 72-75). The other
option would provide for a "skeletal" scope of review. Id.
304. Id. (citing Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Draft for
Discussion Only, at 76).
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clearly prescribe limitations for reviewing courts. There are some
instances in which deference is not an option a reviewing court may
select; rather, it is the only option available. In certain instances, the
legislature commands deference. If a reviewing court fails to give
deference when a statute commands it, the court would be "violating
30 5
the statute making that delegation to the judgment of the agency."
Section 17A.19(11)(c) acknowledges this, as it requires reviewing
courts to give "appropriate deference" to agency views in such
situations. 306 Likewise, section 17A. 19(1 1)(a) states that courts need
30 7
not give deference to an agency's determination of its own powers,
and section 17A. 19(11)(b) does not require deference where the law
30 9
does not require it,30 8 but allows courts to do so in special cases,
such as when the matter under review is within the agency's special
31
expertise. 0
A scientist would tell us that binocular vision helps attain depth
perception. 311 Viewing a subject from multiple vantage points and
through multiple lenses is vital to gaining a full and rich perspective
of the subject. In our view, the issues of discretion and deference, for
a proper understanding, need to be viewed through multiple lenses:
Iowa Code sections 17A.19(l0) and 17A.19(11). These provisions,
when read together, 312 provide the required depth of analysis to fully
understand the complex issues of discretion and deference. 313 We
encourage the drafters of the proposed model state APA to consider
including the language from Iowa Code section 17A. 19(11), and
states to consider adopting it.

305. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.
306. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(11)(c).
307. Id. § 17A.19(11)(a).

308. Id. § 17A.19(11)(b).
309. See supra notes 45-47 and 185-89 and accompanying text.

310. See, e.g., Mosher v. Dep't of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501,
510 (Iowa 2003); BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.
311. See, e.g., SCOTT B. STEINMAN, BARBARA A. STEINMAN & RALPH PHILIP
GARZIA, FOUNDATIONS OF BINOCULAR VISION: A CLINICAL PERSPECTIVE (2000).
312. See BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 61.
313. For two examples of 17A.19(10) and 17A.19(11) being read and applied
as a coherent whole, see Mosher, 671 N.W.2d at 501, and Auen v. Alcoholic
Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 2004).
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Professor Andersen has recognized the need for statutory
amendments to the federal APA and to the model state APA to
specifically address deference, as a reaction to the lack of consistency
in the case law.314 While we agree with his aim, we do not believe
his specific proposals will attain it. First, both of his proposals state
that courts "may" defer to an agency's interpretation of law if certain
conditions are met.315 We do not see how this solves the problem of
inconsistency. By the terms of Andersen's proposed language, a
court need not defer to an agency's views even if certain conditions
are met. This would apparently allow courts to elect not to defer on a
matter even in instances where the matter was committed by law to
the discretion of the agency. 316 In contrast, Iowa Code section
17A. 19(11)(c) would require "appropriate" deference in such
instances, 3 17 with appropriateness being determined based on the
facts of each case.318
In not linking mandatory deference to legislative delegation,
3 19
Andersen states the idea of legislative delegation is "fictitious.,

This characterization may be correct in cases where legislative will is
unclear, but is unhelpful and counterproductive in cases where the
legislature's will was clear. If the legislature commanded deference
to an agency's view on a matter, it is no answer that other
expressions of legislative will concerning deference have been
unclear.
Second, the preconditions for the optional deference that
Andersen proposes (e.g., authoritativeness, agency expertise 320 ),
while perfectly adequate for determining whether to defer in cases
where the legislature did not vest the agency with discretion

314. Andersen, supra note 1; Andersen, supra note 61.

315. Andersen, supra note 1, at 964 (proposed amendment to federal APA);
Andersen, supra note 61, at 1037 (proposed language for model state APA).
316. See supra note 315.
317. IOWA CODE § 17A. 19(11)(c).
318. Cf.BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72. This is not an "all or nothing"
formulation to deference about which Andersen complains. See Andersen, supra
note 1, at 966. Rather, it is "appropriate-or-nothing," a much different construct.
319. Andersen, supra note 61, at 1034; see also Andersen, supra note 1, at
963 ("convenient fiction").
320. Andersen, supra note 1, at 964 (proposed amendment to federal APA);
Andersen, supra note 61, at 1037 (proposed language for model state APA).
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concerning a matter3 21 or determining how much deference an
agency's view is due, are unnecessary to consider when the
legislature clearly vested the agency with discretion concerning a
matter. If the legislature has spoken, the courts must listen. The idea
of deference is essential to a "separated powers model, 3 22 and
judicial review is necessary to police agency action3 23 in order to
ensure agencies exercise only those powers conferred on them by
statute.3 24 We think, however, symmetry is required. If an agency is
only to exercise the powers that are delegated to it, it must also be
permitted to exercise every power it is delegated. Failure to give
deference to an agency's views on the topic, when the legislature has
determined as a matter of law and policy that such deference is
required, "would be violating the statute making that delegation to
judgment of the agency." 32 In policing agencies for illegal action,
326
courts must self-police so they do not themselves act illegally.
We recognize that, even if states adopt deference language
similar to Iowa's statute, courts will continue to face issues
concerning the nature of the delegated authority and whether and to
what extent that authority encompasses the agency interpretation
being reviewed.32 7 In fact, Iowa's courts have had some of these
difficulties in implementing these amendments. 328 However, the
amendments establish a framework for analysis and, in our
experience, have resulted, as intended,329 in increased clarity and ease
of application. The revised Model State Administrative Procedure
Act would benefit from an addition of this language, and the states
would benefit from its adoption.

321.
322.
323.
324.

See supra Parts II, IV.A.
Andersen, supra note 61, at 1036.
Id.; see also BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 59.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 17A.23 (2007).
325. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 72.

326. See, e.g., supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
327. Cf Andersen, supra note 1, at 975 ("This proposal will not end all
uncertainties arising in determining the meaning and effect of agency legal
interpretations.").
328. See supra notes 209-15, 252-73 and accompanying text.
329. BONFIELD, supra note 46, at 59-73.

